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Introduction
In policymaking, as in life, we often must make decisions 
without knowing how the future will play out. Taking 
uncertainty into account when making macroeconomic 
policy allows policymakers to help improve economic 
outcomes. This article considers three aspects of improving 
outcomes for fiscal and monetary policymaking: considering 
risk and uncertainty in decision-making; communicating risk 
and uncertainty; and designing better tools to communicate 
risk.
Managing and 
Communicating  
Risk and Uncertainty in 
Macroeconomic Policymaking
To start with, it is useful to differentiate 
between risk and uncertainty, terms that 
are often used interchangeably.1 Risks are 
what we might call the ‘known unknowns’. 
They are future events for which the 
past provides guidance on both their 
likelihood of occurring and their effects, 
and we can insure ourselves against them. 
An example of a macroeconomic risk for 
the New Zealand economy is exchange 
rate movements: there is a long history of 
exchange rate movements which we can 
use as a basis for assessing the likelihood 
of small or large changes in the future. 
Risk lends itself to measurement and 
quantification by statistical tools. Using 
such tools is a useful and important part 
of policymaking. Further, the results of 
such measurement and quantification 
can, and often should, be communicated 
to the public.
 By contrast, uncertainty captures 
the ‘unknown unknowns’, often called 
Knightian uncertainty following the 
pioneering work of Frank Knight 
(1921). Uncertainty is about events 
that cannot be foreseen or defined a 
priori. Their likelihood of occurrence 
and macroeconomic impacts are 
not quantifiable because the past is 
considered to provide little guide to the 
future. Hence, statistical tools cannot be 
used to evaluate the likelihood of future 
outcomes. By definition it is difficult to 
discuss specific uncertain events, and 
so we focus here on uncertainty as a 
concept. If we can describe likely events 
and the damage they may then do, they 
are risks, not uncertainties. 
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But how should we react to the genuine 
uncertainties? Optimal behaviour when 
faced with uncertainty is to minimise the 
potential damage from worst possible 
outcomes. This is known as maximin (i.e. 
maximize the minimum) in the technical 
literature. But how should this concept be 
applied in practice? A good response is to 
think about strategies to build resilience 
capable of cushioning against adverse 
outcomes. We may not know what all the 
uncertainties are, but we can think about 
our ability to absorb these uncertainties 
as they unfold. Some uncertainties will 
be positive, and these can be treated as 
windfalls. In this vein, we will describe 
how such resilience might be evaluated 
and communicated as a worthwhile 
answer to the difficulties of describing 
uncertainties and the impossibility of 
quantifying them.
Dealing with risk and uncertainty 
is a fruitful area for advancing better 
government through collaboration 
between academics and those who make 
policy. It requires an understanding of the 
available tools with their strengths and 
weaknesses, an area in which academia 
has a definite strength, while government 
advisers and decision-makers bring an 
understanding of where such analyses 
might be applied to inform and improve 
policy.
How do policymakers take risk and 
uncertainty into account when making 
decisions?
Macroeconomic policies are often made 
with the goal of reducing economic 
fluctuations and the risks around them. 
Uncertainties around future policy 
reactions can be converted into risks by 
outlining how policymakers would react 
in various scenarios (Ilut and Schneider, 
2014), to reduce risk around the policies 
themselves (Fernández-Villaverde et al., 
2015)2 and to reduce the size of economic 
fluctuations (Bekaert, Hoerova and Duca, 
2013). Lowering economic and policy risk 
by identifying possible risks and using 
them to inform policymaking cultivates 
an economic environment in which 
businesses tend to invest more and employ 
more people (Bloom, Bond and Van 
Reenen, 2007; Bloom, 2009). Likewise, if 
consumers perceive income certainty they 
will tend to spend more (Bertola, Guiso 
and Pistaferri, 2005). Conversely, more 
risk – other things being equal – means 
less income, less investment and more 
unemployment. Reducing risk can thus 
help to both increase the level of GDP and 
reduce fluctuations in GDP.3
In New Zealand, as one of the two 
pillars of macroeconomic policy, fiscal 
policy contributes to reducing economic 
uncertainty by keeping public finances 
in order, sustaining a stable tax system 
and ensuring predictable expenditure 
policies. As the second pillar, monetary 
policy contributes to reducing economic 
uncertainty by maintaining price stability 
through a transparent and predictable 
interest rate policy.  
 In practice, policymaking by mone-
tary and fiscal authorities for 
macroeconomic risk management 
purposes typically consists of four basic 
steps: the identification and quantification 
of risk; decisions about whether to 
mitigate risks; decisions about whether to 
make provision for risks; and decisions 
about whether to accommodate for 
residual risks (IMF, 2016). A variety of 
analytical tools support those decision-
making processes. A typical set of 
heuristic methods includes: general 
probabilistic assessment of current and 
projected economic conditions based on 
historical risk valuation; the classification 
and valuation of risk that can be 
controlled or reacted to; assessments of 
specific alternative risk scenarios, and 
which risks are simply beyond the control 
of policymakers; and the cost–benefit 
analysis of policy options. 
In international comparisons, many 
observers rank New Zealand practices 
among the most advanced (for example, 
on the monetary policy framework see 
Svensson, 2009; for fiscal policy see Ter-
Minassian, 2014). The standard practice is 
that policy decisions refer to an assessment 
of risks and alternative scenarios that 
have been considered. On the other hand, 
we seldom find in available documents 
formal probabilistic assessment of 
projected economic conditions or cost–
benefit analysis. We are among those who 
argue that more can be done in these areas 
in New Zealand. We return to this point 
in the final sections of this article, where 
we talk about tools for communicating 
risk outlooks and cooperation between 
government institutions and academia.   
 We often look to the past for guidance 
on which policies appear to work or not 
work in order to make better policy. 
Whether this is done informally through 
discussion or formally as a statistical 
analysis of past policies, it is important 
that we are aware that the past was, at the 
time, a risky future. Orphanides (2001) 
shows how the uncertainty in the real-
time data has real consequences if we 
ignore it and simply look at historically 
revised data when evaluating monetary 
policy decisions of the past. For example, 
with hindsight, revised data may show 
that a recession was not as large as was 
thought at the time and that monetary 
policy was  overly loose. 
Risk analysis can be very extensive, 
and for those interested in an academic 
reading on policy and uncertainty we 
suggest Public Policy in an Uncertain 
World: analysis and decisions by Charles 
Manski (2013). However, there is a limit 
to what policy can achieve with respect 
to reducing and managing risks. Kydland 
and Prescott (1977) teach us that good 
policy does not need to, and often 
should not, try to react to every single 
development. 
On the other hand, no matter how 
many risk scenarios policymakers 
consider, they will still face uncertainty 
– the ‘unknown unknown’. What should 
... we seldom find in available 
documents formal probabilistic 
assessment of projected economic 
conditions or cost–benefit analysis.
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policymakers do when faced with such 
uncertainties? There are two angles to 
the answer. The first is operational: 
what is the first best response when the 
unknown unknown materialises? To 
minimise mistakes in such situations, 
robust control theory recommends that 
policymakers follow heuristics (‘rules 
of thumb’). Rules of thumb support 
robust decisions that help minimise the 
ex post adverse outcomes in the case of 
uncertainties (see, for example, Dupuis, 
James and Peterson, 2000; Hansen and 
Sargent, 2001). 
The second response is building the 
resilience of the economy. Instead of only 
trying to consider what uncertainties 
the economy faces, we might also 
consider how to improve the ability of 
the economy to ‘roll with the punches’. 
An example in fiscal policy is the idea 
of ‘fiscal space’: that is, ensuring that the 
country is positioned such that should 
adverse uncertainties become manifest, it 
is possible to implement fiscal policies to 
counter them. The experience of Ireland 
and Spain during the recent global 
financial crisis illustrates the value of 
such ‘fiscal space’: both countries found 
themselves in a position where fiscal 
austerity was necessary, despite being 
undesirable during a recession; if they 
had gone into the crisis with greater fiscal 
space and resilience they would have been 
able to avoid this. The aim of such policies 
should be to enhance the resilience and 
adaptability of the economy to absorb 
adverse economic shocks arising from the 
‘unknown’ in the long term. Examples for 
fiscal policy of measuring such resilience 
include fiscal space and fiscal stress tests, 
both of which are described in more 
detail later.
As mentioned above, uncertain events 
by definition cannot be directly measured; 
they are unknown and unknowable. 
However, we can discuss the concepts of 
uncertainty and resilience. Policymakers 
can discuss resilience and weaknesses 
(we will later describe ways to measure 
resilience). Thinking about how to 
deepen resilience and remove weaknesses 
provides a sensible strategy for dealing 
with uncertainty.
Should risk and uncertainty be 
communicated?
The potential power of communicating 
policy is captured in the term ‘open mouth 
operations’ coined by former Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand governor Don Brash. 
He observed that he seemed to be able 
to move interest rates simply by talking, 
without conducting the actual open 
market operations the Reserve Bank uses 
to steer short-term interest rates. But just 
communicating policy is not a panacea. 
Poor or unclear communication might 
work against policy actions, weakening 
their effect. Evidence from monetary 
economics, for example, emphasises the 
role of good, clear communication in 
reinforcing the effects of monetary policy 
actions.4 
 So, good, clear communication 
of policy in general is important. Can 
the same be said of communication of 
risks and uncertainties? Since uncertain 
events involve the unknowable, these 
events cannot be readily communicated. 
Hence, we will focus here on risk. The 
communication of macroeconomic risks 
faces a similar challenge to the one we 
saw in making policy in the face of risks: 
communication should not add to existing 
risks. So how might communicating risks 
help to reduce their material impacts if 
realised? Is it even possible to be clear 
about risks?
There are two main reasons to believe 
that risks should be communicated. The 
first is to explicitly acknowledge that 
government policy is being made in a 
risky world. This includes acknowledging 
whether or not policymakers are 
explicitly accounting for risks in their 
decisions, or are simply making decisions 
as if things were certain. Being open in 
communicating the particular risks in the 
face of which policy was made helps the 
public better understand policymakers’ 
objectives and reasoning. The second is 
to help justify any future recalibration 
of policy. If risks were not initially 
communicated, any subsequent policy 
adjustments may appear to be an ‘about 
face’. This greater public understanding 
is likely to make subsequent policy 
adjustments easier to implement 
politically.
Take earthquake insurance as an 
example of the second point. Suppose 
the risk of an earthquake occurring is 
viewed as having increased, because, say, 
of a better scientific understanding of the 
causes of seismic activity. This suggests 
that the insurance premiums should rise. 
If the risk and its subsequent increase 
have been communicated, then it will 
be understood that this rise has not 
involved any change in policy, but simply 
reflects the same policy being updated 
to reflect evolving circumstances. The 
understanding of higher risk of an 
earthquake is also likely to trigger a 
market response, such as better household 
preparedness or changes in the building 
code.
But can regular communication help 
make things clearer and reduce the level 
of risk? One example of communication 
reducing the level of risk is from exchange 
rate regimes. Fixed exchange rates in one 
sense should be more predictable, but 
in practice they are subject to periodic 
large and sudden revaluations. Allowing 
the exchange rate to float – so that it 
reflects existing market perceptions of 
risk – can actually make its movements 
more predictable. It communicates the 
necessary (price) information for the 
market participants: the private sector 
accepts and adapts to the exchange 
rate risks as part of its business 
environment. Floating the exchange rate 
[A case for] communicating risks is 
simply that the analysis of these risks will 
often already have been undertaken as 
part of policymaking, and this information 
may be valuable in and of itself.
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eventually reduces the risk of building 
macroeconomic imbalances and systemic 
vulnerability to crisis (Ghosh and Ostry, 
2009). 
A further case for communicating risks 
is simply that the analysis of these risks 
will often already have been undertaken as 
part of policymaking, and this information 
may be valuable in and of itself.
Of course, there may be a limit to how 
much can and should be communicated. 
The United States Federal Reserve board 
of governors’ choice to publish their 
Tealbooks and Bluebooks with a time lag 
is an example of constraining the degree 
of communication in order to protect the 
quality of policy deliberations. A former 
vice-chairman, Don Kohn, has argued 
that although prompt publication of such 
documents may be useful from the public’s 
perspective, it is not so clear that it is 
desirable from the institution’s perspective. 
The main concern was that the board staff 
would be more cautious (and thus less 
open) in putting their recommendations 
forward if they knew they were going to 
be made public with the decision. 
We now turn to economic resilience. 
We feel that evaluation and communica-
tion of resilience, both qualitative and 
quantitative, would be beneficial for two 
reasons. First, the need to communicate 
issues of resilience to the public would 
help focus policymakers on thinking 
through the issue clearly. Second, and 
most importantly given the difficulties 
relating to resilience to uncertainty, it 
will allow for open feedback from the 
general public. Some of this feedback will 
be in the form of direct submissions to 
government agencies, but much is likely 
to be simply public discussion in the news 
media and online. Discussion of resilience 
is likely to be mostly qualitative, given 
the unquantifiable nature of uncertainty. 
There will be a lesser role for quantitative 
assessments, such as measuring fiscal space 
and implementing stress tests. Stress tests 
involve quantitatively looking at how the 
economy would react to combinations of 
major shocks which would be large by 
historical standards.
Tools to communicate risks 
This section examines some examples 
of informal and formal (statistical) 
communication of risks in the practice 
of monetary and fiscal policy in New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the 
US; we also draw some general lessons for 
policy more broadly.
Verbal communication 
Central banks have been at the forefront in 
communicating policy. For instance, the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand publishes a 
monetary policy statement accompanying 
every decision on setting interest rates, 
explaining the bank’s views on the state 
of the economy and why it made the 
decision it did.5 These statements include 
some discussion of both uncertainty 
and risk, but do not extend to a formal 
evaluation of risks. There is also typically 
an accompanying series of research papers 
and notes providing deeper analyses of 
specific topics.
Other central banks take this a 
step further and release the minutes of 
their policy deliberations (for example, 
the Bank of England, the US Federal 
Reserve System and the Reserve Bank 
of Australia). Releasing the minutes is 
seen not only as a way to communicate 
why certain policy decisions were made; 
by revealing internal disagreements at 
these meetings the minutes also provide 
a gauge as to how much confidence 
there was around reaching the final 
decision and guide expectations about 
risks surrounding future economic 
outcomes. Some market analysts set 
up word-counters: if statements are 
longer than average, this may signal that 
decisions were hard to make; repetition 
of particular words may signal specific 
policy biases. This informal measure 
of risk is seen as an important part of 
communicating the monetary policy 
decisions of these central banks.
 We turn now to considering a few 
examples of more formal analysis (with 
an acknowledgement that these methods 
are appropriate only for risk and not 
for uncertainty): the use of fan charts, 
alternative scenarios and identification of 
the nature and sources of risks. 
Fan charts
One example of formally communicat-
ing risk is the Bank of England’s fan 
charts.6 Each quarter the Bank of 
England releases an inflation report7 
which contains forecasts of short-term 
interest rates, inflation or GDP growth, 
forecasts that are not just a single path 
(or ‘baseline forecast’). ‘Uncertainty’ 
around the forecasts is shown in the 
form of fan charts showing a range of 
possible future outcomes, along with 
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Figure 1: An illustrative fan chart for RBNZ forecast of 90-day interest rate
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand; authors’ calculations
Note: The fan chart in this figure is for illustrative purposes only. The Reserve Bank does not publish its forecast with any measure of 
confidence. We construct the confidence intervals using a vector autoregressive model of CPI quarterly inflation, GDP quarterly 
growth, 90-day rate and quarterly percentage change in the real trade-weighted index of exchange rates. The model was 
estimated on quarterly New Zealand data from 1995q1 through 2015q4.
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estimations of how likely they are to 
occur. 
In Figure 1 we present an illustration 
of what a fan chart for the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand’s forecast of the 
interest rate on the 90-day bank bill, 
the key money market rate, might look 
like. The Treasury in its budget and 
half-year economic updates regularly 
publishes a similar measure of risk for 
its public revenue projections. The left-
hand side of the figure simply shows 
historical outcomes, and so we just have 
the solid line. At present all the Reserve 
Bank publishes is a point forecast for 
interest rates, which is here shown as 
the dotted line extending into the future. 
But the future is uncertain, and while the 
present forecasts simply present a single 
future, a fan chart provides much richer 
information about other likely future 
outcomes. These likely alternative futures 
are represented by the shaded regions. 
The darker regions represent the central 
outcome, with lighter regions indicating 
progressively less likely outcomes.
While the Treasury and Reserve 
Bank discuss risks in their economic 
forecasts, their probabilistic evaluation 
is not as systematic as it could be 
and it is often limited to a handful 
of forecasted variables. We believe 
that fan charts, or some other way of 
illustrating the probabilistic measure of 
confidence about the economic outlook, 
should be routinely reported for every 
macroeconomic variable that the Treasury 
and Reserve Bank forecast. Enhancing 
their communication in this way would 
benefit public discussion about economic 
policy and help build its credibility. Such 
measures of confidence will shed light 
on how optimistic or pessimistic those 
forecasts are.
Alternative scenarios
Another common communication 
tool is the assessment of plausible 
alternative scenarios. Fan charts provide 
information about the likely distribution 
of economic outcomes for all possible 
risks and combinations of them that the 
economy faced in the past. However, the 
economy might be subject to very specific 
headwinds or tailwinds. The alternative 
scenarios evaluate the economic impact 
of these specific risks. When assigned 
probabilistic weights and aggregated, the 
alternative scenarios measure helps to 
reduce the balance of prevailing risks. We 
should stress that the alternative scenarios 
are a measure of perceived risks and are 
therefore inherently subjective. 
At its full width the shaded area in the 
fan chart in Figure 1 displays the likely 
outcomes in 90% of possible futures, an 
assessment based on all the economic 
outcomes seen over the past 20 years of 
a stable monetary policy regime. The 
dashed line represents the probabilistically 
weighted alternative economic scenarios. 
The purpose of the alternative scenarios is 
to help narrow, and point to, skewness in 
the uncertainty distribution and inform 
the decision-makers about the likely 
direction of the risks. In the case shown 
in Figure 1, the probabilistic summary of 
alternative scenarios points to risks being 
skewed to the downside over the forecast 
horizon, informing the policymaker that 
they are more likely to face downside 
than upside risks.
Risk classification and identification
Not all risks can be controlled for or are 
worth responding to. For macroeconomic 
risk management in practice, we also 
need to understand the sources of risk. A 
useful tool is a structural macroeconomic 
model that allows us to identify the main 
structural drivers of risk that underpin fan 
charts such as the one above. Using such 
models for structural decompositions of 
historical risks helps identify risks that 
can be fully or partially controlled, and 
those that are simply uncontrollable and 
must be accepted. 
For example, current research on 
the sources of risks for the government 
net debt projections classifies risks into 
three main categories: macroeconomic 
uncertainty, statistical uncertainty and 
fiscal uncertainty. Table 1 illustrates 
the risk classification. Governments 
have no control over statistical risk (for 
example, GDP figures are subject to 
data revisions). Governments have only 
modest control over macroeconomic 
risk arising from external sources, such 
as the level of Chinese demand, the 
exchange rate, foreign competition, 
droughts and so on. The level of fiscal 
policy risks is, however, under the 
government’s control, especially over 
longer periods of time. 
The risk classification yields useful 
insights. For example, most of the risks 
related to statistical confidence are 
over short time horizons, and thus the 
government could not control or reduce 
these risks. Policymakers may, however, 
choose to create a buffer capable of 
absorbing the consequences of these 
risks, and the risk identification and 
quantification allows us to evaluate the size 
such a buffer would need to be. Or they 
can communicate risks by making clear 
that debt level targets are best understood 
as a general goal, not as something to be 
hit with precision. By contrast, over longer 
time horizons the majority of the risks 
fall into the category of fiscal policy risks 
Table 1: Sources of risks for net core Crown debt projections: illustration 
Fiscal year Macroeconomic risks Fiscal risks Statistical error risks
2015 0% 0% 100%
2016 20% 49% 32%
2017 25% 63% 12%
2018 27% 64% 9%
2019 27% 65% 8%
2020 27% 65% 8%
2021 27% 66% 7%
2022 26% 69% 5%
2023 26% 72% 3%
2024 25% 74% 1%
Source: Authors’ calculations
Note: For illustration purposes only. Units are the percentage shares of total risk. The results above are taken from the authors’ work on 
measuring uncertainty around the government’s target of reducing the value of net public debt to below 20% of GDP by around 
2020.
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(i.e. risks around tax revenue outcomes or 
expenditure policy), and are thus within 
the government’s ability to control and 
reduce by communication or guidance.
Conclusion
We conclude that greater awareness 
of the risk landscape in which policy 
decisions are made leads to better policy, 
and allows for the possibility of better 
communication of policy decisions to 
the public. The Treasury and Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand currently include 
a discussion of various risks in their 
public communications, but would 
benefit from better and more systematic 
communication of these risks to the 
public. Publishing measures of statistical 
confidence for economic projections 
or assumptions underlying economic 
policies should be the new practice. Doing 
so will require an effort to separate what 
events are considered to be quantifiable 
risks and what are uncertainties.
Adoption of some of the tools for 
formally analysing risk that we have 
discussed may be difficult for institutions 
without advanced analytical capabilities. 
But it represents a perfect opportunity 
for cooperation between government 
agencies and universities. Academic 
research can help to advance better 
government in this area by providing key 
analytical capability and build internal 
government capability through education 
and training.
1 There is also an aspect of ambiguity in the context of 
risks and uncertainties that can give rise to heterogeneous 
expectations (Hansen and Sargent, 2012), but we will leave 
this aspect out of the present discussion.
2 For example, consider the ‘debt ceilings’ in the United 
States. These impose a dollar limit on the amount of debt 
that the US government can issue. But Congress can 
approve a budget for spending and revenue that would 
necessitate an amount of borrowing in excess of this limit. 
This creates a risk relating to what would actually happen if 
the debt ceiling is not raised, and this risk is created by the 
policies themselves.
3 This latter point of reducing fluctuations in GDP should 
not, however, be over-interpreted as saying that the level 
of uncertainty is more than a minor contributing factor to 
recessions (Bachmann and Bayer, 2013; Bachmann, Elstner 
and Sims, 2013; Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng, 2015).
4 See http://www.voxeu.org/article/central-bank-
communication; http://www.voxeu.org/article/measuring-
clarity-central-bank-communication.
5 The Reserve Bank has been releasing monetary policy 
statements going back to 1996: see http://www.rbnz.govt.
nz/monetary_policy/monetary_policy_statement/.
6 The Bank of England was one of the first central banks to 
introduce this communication tool.
7 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/
inflationreport/default.aspx.
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